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Ya lo verá. ¡Como nos vamos a hacer ricos! Mira, todas esas tierras no tienen dueño y 
aunque son puros terregales poniéndole ganas pronto se convertirán en praderas 
verdes…serán productivas. ¡Que caray! El Río, en menos de veinte años será floreciente. 
¡Ya los verá Juan…! ¡Ya lo veremos todos…!1 
 
“You will see! All of us will see!” Tío Isaac tells his nephew Juan in the historical 
fiction novel El Río: Cronología de Mexicali. El Río, Juan ponders the name and then in 
a flash the mighty Colorado River lays bare and wild before him. Enrique Estrada Barrera 
crests a wave of authors who sought to record early pioneer memories of Mexicali, a 
border settlement in the northeast corner of Baja California, Mexico at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Barrera begins with the tale of Juan, a youngster traveling with his 
uncle across the vast desert to reach the only hope for prosperity in the arid region, the 
Colorado River.  
The “Nile of the West” begins its course in Colorado, winding through the seven 
U.S. Basin States, Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Nevada, California, and Arizona, 
before crossing the international border into Baja California, Mexico.2 The Colorado 
River Delta refers to this lowermost region, south of the border. Once home of the 
Cocopah Indians who survived as subsistence farmers growing gourds and melons on the 
fertile banks of the Colorado,3 the Delta now faces one of the greatest ecological troubles 
of the West; as Colorado River flows decrease, the land returns to desert.4 Because of the 
                                                
1 “You will see! How we will get rich! Look, all of these lands are unclaimed and, although they are putting 
2 To further clarify, the seven U.S. Basin States consist of all U.S. states through which the Colorado River 
flows. Each of these seven states receives a portion of Colorado River water per year. The Basin States are 
divided into Upper Basin and Lower Basin States. The Upper Basin consists of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, 
and New Mexico and the Lower Basin consist of Nevada, Arizona, and California.  
3 Evan R. Ward, Border Oasis: Water and the Political Ecology of the Colorado River Delta, 1940-1975 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003), Chapter 1. 
4 The Colorado used to end in the Gulf of California but no longer does so because of recued flows. This 
presents a severe problem not only for individuals living and farming in the region but for wildlife 





vital role the Colorado has played in this region since turn of the century settlement, the 
Delta has served as an economic and political battlefield between agrarian communities 
across state and international borders. The Delta provides the scene for this thesis about 
the Salinity Crisis, a diplomatic imbroglio over the water of the Colorado River that 
dominated international relations between the United States and Mexico from 1961 to 
1973.  
When Juan and Tío Isaac would have arrived to what would later become 
Mexicali, the river was strong and all Tío Isaac could think about was how to tame this 
liquid gold, making farmland out of desert and his fortune. The fictional Tío Isaac would 
not have been the first with this idea; by the time families like his arrived the “gringos” to 
the north had already begun irrigating the Colorado and investing in what would 
eventually become one of California’s strongest agricultural centers, the Imperial Valley.5  
It is this pioneer spirit, nationalistic borderland competition and engineering craft 
that shape the narrative of the Salinity Crisis.6 This story begins roughly sixty years after 
the founding of Mexicali7 when an international treaty governed irrigation systems on 
both sides of the border and the Mexicali Valley almost equaled the Imperial Valley in 
agricultural strength. The Colorado River Compact of 1922 divvied up yearly 
                                                
5 Barrera, El Río, 2.  
6 The maxim “first in time, first in right” (1872) defined water apportionment in the American West before 
interstate and international agreements. This principle falls under prior appropriation doctrine, that is, water 
is allocated based on who first puts the source to beneficial use. This differs from the doctrine of riparian 
right, that is, water rights are determined based on the property rights to the land adjacent to the source. 
“First in time, first in right” heightened the intensity of competition over water in the arid West and the 
Colorado River Delta between American states and between the United States and Mexico. Opponents 
labored to put as much Colorado River water to use as possible before their rivals to gain economic 
advantage. This incentivized rapid develop without concern for long-term sustainability. On this see: 
Lawrence J. MacDonnell and Sarah F. Bates, ed. Natural Resources Policy and Law: Trends and 
Directions (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1993); Norris Hundley, Jr., Water and the West (Berkeley, 
California: University Press, 1975); Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of 
the American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).  





apportionments of Colorado River water between the seven U.S. Basin States. However, 
Mexico, excluded from the Compact, did not secure a stable allotment of river water until 
the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty,8 which established that the United States must deliver 
1.5 MAFY (million-acre-feet-per-year) of water to Mexico.9 The Treaty also increased 
the powers of the International Boundary & Water Commission/Comisión Internacional 
de Limites y Aguas (IBWC/CILA) with U.S. and Mexican components to ensure water-
sharing practices acceptable to those on both sides of the border.10  
In 1960, irrigation practice on the lower Colorado River drastically changed, 
testing the constraints of the Mexican Water Treaty and creating the biggest diplomatic 
dispute between Mexico and the United States since the 1938 oil expropriations.11 
Ultimately, the advocacy of peasant farmers or campesinos in the Mexicali Valley, those 
most directly affected by this Colorado River water crisis, forced both the U.S. and 
Mexican governments to engage in solution-finding negotiations. The final resolution to 
the crisis in 1973 largely favored Mexican interests because of sustained campesino 
activism for over a decade. This seldom discussed history is remarkable not only for what 
it reveals about U.S.-Mexican relations during the tumultuous years of the 1960s-70s but 
also for the unconventional principal actors, the Mexicali peasant farmers, responsible for 
shaping its outcome.  
                                                
8 The United States refused to recognize several Mexican governments in the years following the Mexican 
Revolution, citing the large amounts of uncompensated damage of U.S. property. The seven U.S. Basin 
States used this to justify excluding Mexico from the 1922 Colorado River Compact.  
9 Almost all of the 1.5 MAFY of Colorado River water received by Mexico went to Mexicali. A small 
portion served as potable water for the cities of Mexicali and Tijuana, but the majority was used to irrigate 
Mexicali agriculture. 
10 The IBWC/CILA in its first form was created by the Convention of 1889 between the United States and 
Mexico, which delineated the water boundaries between the two nations.  
11 In 1938, Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated all foreign-owned oil businesses and related 
infrastructures, many of which were American owned. This provoked the international boycott of Mexican 
products; T. R. Martin to George C. McGee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “Proposed Delay in 
Study of Salinity Problem on Colorado River,” April 26, 1962, NACP, RG 59, DF, 1960-63, 611.12322, 





In the decades leading up to the aforementioned crisis, serious ecological 
problems began to threaten the sustainability of both the Yuma Valley and the Mexicali 
Valley, agricultural communities based in the exhaustive irrigation of desert soils. In the 
Yuma Valley, the high salinity of many water supplies used for irrigation threatened to 
reduce crop yields, forcing farmers to look for alternative means to preserve the purity of 
their water supplies. In the mid-1930s, Yuma Valley agriculturalists began to use 
groundwaters from underground aquifers to irrigate their lands when well waters they had 
been utilizing began to dry up.12 However, “without adequate drainage or sufficient 
rainfall, the increasing level of toxic salts eventually made the recycled groundwater 
harmful to crops.”13 To combat salt pollution, the Bureau of Reclamation and the 
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District began pumping the highly saline groundwater from 
the underground aquifers and replacing the supply with fresh Colorado water as part of 
the Gila Project.14  
However, in efforts to save their community, the Yuma Valley’s practices began 
directly injuring another, just across the southern borderline. The Bureau of Reclamation 
deposited the wastewaters, extracted from highly saline underground aquifers, just below 
Yuma intake points but just above the Morelos Dam, the pivotal point of intake for the 
last users of Colorado River water, Mexican farmers. The Mexicali farmers, cultivating 
                                                
12 Evan R. Ward, “The Irrigated Oasis: Transformation of the Colorado River Delta, 1940-1975” (PhD 
diss., University of Georgia, 2000), 92-93; In 1935, the Coolidge Dam was completed and the Gila River 
no longer had enough water to replenish the underground wells agriculturalists had been using.  
13 Ibid., 93; Waters originating from underground aquifers contained 4,000 ppm of salt before dilution.  
14 The Gila Project, authorized in 1937, laid the groundwork for Yuma wastewater practices. The Gila 
Project was not immediately supported but local Arizona spokesmen fought bitterly to preserve Yuma 
Valley agriculture. Evan R. Ward explores this topic in Chapter 3 of Border Oasis. Ward writes an expert 
on water use, Dr. Harlan H. Barrows offered the following as solutions to the Yuma salinity issue: 
Colorado River water could be imported, farmers could move, or the Bureau of Reclamation “could simply 
‘leave the…area to the inevitable conclusion of present trends,’” this third option being re-desertification. 
However, the aggressive efforts of Arizona leaders “push[ed] for development and the preservation of 
existing property rights obscure[ing] more critical questions about the capacity of the land…to sustain 





primarily cotton and wheat in the state of Baja California, Mexico, sustained roughly 
400,000 inhabitants in the state’s capital city by the early 1960s. Uninformed of Yuma’s 
new wastewater practices, Mexican farmers were suddenly faced with the frightening 
circumstance of stunted or dying crops with no immediate idea as to why. Mexicali 
waters dramatically went from 800 ppm (parts-per-million) of salt content to 1,500 ppm 
annually.15 
Shortly after Yuma began these wastewater practices, Mexicali farmers identified 
the increased salinity of waters as the cause of declining crop yields. Mexicali farmers 
were outraged and the Mexican Government launched a formal complaint to the United 
States. Farmers south of the border felt the Yuma practices were not only a direct threat 
to their livelihoods but also an attempt by the United States to take advantage of Mexico 
as the less powerful country for the benefit of U.S. agriculture. Mexicali farmers refused 
to accept what they considered to be inequity and waged a grassroots war of protest that 
engaged the entire country and quickly reached even the Oval Office. U.S. officials 
justified Yuma’s actions, referring back to the Mexican Water Treaty of 1944 which 
guaranteed Mexico 1.5 MAFY of water. This treaty specified the quantity of water the 
United States owed Mexico but not the quality of that water. The Mexican public and 
representatives fiercely denied this reading of the Treaty, demanding their water quota be 
usable and not highly saline.  
                                                
15 Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, “Introduction” of Resolution of the United States-
Mexico Colorado river Salinity Problem, Special Report: Negotiations with Involved Water User 
Organizations in the United States, August 1973 Boulder City Draft (Boulder City, Colorado: August 17, 
1973), WRCA, Milton N. Nathanson papers, Carton 2, Folder 42, 1-9; In October of 1962, the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) concluded that the highly saline wastewaters were in fact 





The ensuing battle to survive salinity became the top priority issue of international 
diplomacy between the United States and Mexico for over a decade. Yuma Valley and 
Mexicali Valley farmers argued bitterly over Colorado River water from 1961 until the 
formal resolution of the crisis in 1973 with Minute 242 which guaranteed Mexico a 
certain quality of water. Agriculturalists on both sides of the border engaged their 
senators, governors, engineers, and presidents in this debate. This thesis will connect the 
diplomatic exchange between high-ranking officials on both sides of the border to the 
grassroots movements of Mexicali campesinos and the regional Colorado River water 
wars in an effort to clarify the immediate significance of the Salinity Crisis (1961-1973) 
as well as situate this moment within global events, demonstrating its broader legacy.  
This work argues that Mexicali campesinos, through visible protest and 
engagement of the Mexican and U.S. governments in the debate over salinity, forced the 
initiation of the serious diplomatic exchange necessary to resolve the crisis. Because of 
Mexico’s role as a third party to the Cold War, the strongly voiced anti-Americanism of 
Mexicali protestors caused the United States to fear losing Mexico as an ally against the 
encroachment of communism in the Western Hemisphere. The sustained pressure of 
Mexicali campesino advocacy throughout the 1960s secured that the Salinity Crisis 
would remain the critical policy issue between the United States and Mexico into the 
early 1970s. Mexicali campesinos, a historically disadvantaged population, successfully 
changed the course of U.S.-Mexico relations in the 1960s-70s, becoming the focal point 
of diplomatic exchange between the nations at the height of the Cold War and ultimately 





The international political climate set the context for the crisis. John F. Kennedy 
took office on January 20, 1961, just two years after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, a 
critical turning point in U.S.-Latin American relations. Despite the “Good Neighbor” 
policy initiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1933 that promised non-
intervention and non-interference in Latin American countries, Kennedy defined his early 
presidential career with the failed CIA-supported attack on the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 
followed by the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Just a month prior to the Bay of 
Pigs Invasion, Kennedy had proposed the Alliance for Progress, an offer of economic 
partnership between the United States and Latin American countries to “build a 
hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out 
their lives in dignity and in freedom.”16 Kennedy not only hoped to gain economic 
partners with the Alliance for Progress but more importantly democratic allies to prevent 
the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere.  
Mexico represented a third party interest in the political and ideological struggle 
between the United States and the Eastern Bloc. The United States, therefore, faced the 
challenge of creating a unified Western Hemisphere rooted in capitalist democracy 
without being perceived as bully who imposed its vision of world order on Mexico. With 
the memory of the Mexican Revolution still very much alive, the Mexican government 
and public supported the Cuban Revolution and Castro’s regime. Mexico sustained 
positive relations with the United States but also maintained ties with Cuba for six years 
after all other members of the Organization of American States (OAS) severed their ties 
                                                
16 Renata Keller, “Capitalizing on Castro: Mexico’s Foreign Relations with Cuba, 1959-1969” (Austin, 





with Cuba in 1964.17  This dual relationship gave Mexico leverage in its relations with 
both the United States and Cuba. Mexico became a go-between for the United States and 
the U.S.S.R., democracy and communism, western and eastern power. Any event that 
shook the U.S.-Mexican friendship was therefore perceived as a threat to Western 
freedom and U.S. world dominance.  
The Salinity Crisis did just that. Suddenly, a discourse of “anti-imperialism” 
flooded the Mexicali Valley, a shift that alarmed not only high-ranking officials but also 
the general constituency of the United States, specifically those who lived in the border 
regions of Southern Arizona and California. Many regular citizens, in addition to local 
farmers and engineers, sent distressed letters to their senators, governors, and the White 
House, insisting the United States do something to ameliorate the situation lest 
communists take over the Mexicali Valley.18 The Los Angeles Times reported on March 
17, 1963:   
MEXICALI – The Colorado – which means reddish – River has brought a flow of 
left-wing extremists and Communists to Baja California in recent months…[the 
river] has brought this flow of Reds because it has supplied two things essential 
for Marxist propaganda: unrest among the lower working classes and anti-
Americanism.19  
 
The degree to which communist forces were directly involved in campesino 
protests is difficult to discern. Several Mexican political entities, namely the government-
controlled agrarian union Campesina Central Independiente (CCI) and the political party 
                                                
17 Christopher M. White, Creating a Third World: Mexico, Cuba, and the United States during the Castro 
Era (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 2007), 49.  
18 For example, Engineer Spence McIntyre of International Engineering wrote frequently to the Department 
of State urging the Federal Government to find a fast solution to the Salinity Crisis. Engineer McIntyre 
often included clippings from local newspaper, many from the Los Angeles Times. The articles included 
the current state and political complications of the crisis with a focus on the growing communist influence 
in Mexicali; NACP, RG 59, DF, 1960-63, 611.12322.  
19 Ruben Salazar, “River Row Makes Reds Flood Baja California,” Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1963, 





Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) were leftist organizations with undoubtedly 
some socialist and communist members and Castro supporters.20  Such organizations had 
vested interest in the Salinity Crisis and often worked with local Mexicali leaders to 
organize anti-American protests. However, the goal of this thesis is not to establish the 
extent to which communist organizations and ideologies took sway of Mexicali and 
threatened democracy in the borderlands. It is, instead, to understand how the perceived 
peril of communism at the southern border shook the American public and the offices of 
Washington, forcing the U.S. Federal Government to respond with urgency to the crisis.  
Despite officials’ early attempts to deflect responsibility for the Salinity Crisis, 
the atmosphere of international politics in the early 1960s transformed a preoccupation of 
farmers and engineers into a matter of U.S. national security. From 1961 until 1973, the 
U.S. Government faced the challenge of maintaining peaceable relations with Mexico by 
taking responsibility for the crisis without undermining Arizona’s economic interests.   
 
Historiography 
The history of the Colorado River Delta falls within the recent scholarly trend of 
borderlands history, roughly the study of the political, economic, social/cultural, and 
environmental interactions between communities along national borderlines. Largely 
ignored, the Delta’s history is little more than 100 years old. There are a few topics in the 
chronicle of the Delta that have received special scholarly attention. One is the early U.S. 
                                                
20 The MLN became increasing communist in the years just before the Salinity Crisis with the support of 
former president and member of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) or the Mexican Communist Party 
Lázaro Cárdenas. Cárdenas also founded the CCI in 1963. Still, the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), nearly eradicated the power of the PCM with a raid on the party’s national office in 
1958 and the suppression of a PCM-led railroad strike. Therefore, the PCM had too little power and 
political backing to truly have played a large role in Mexicali campesino protests; White, Creating a Third 
World, 55; Columbia University, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, Partido Comunista Mexicano 





filibuster settlement, which defined growth on both sides of the border into the beginning 
decades of the 1900s.21 Another addresses the legislative milestones of the 1922 
Colorado River Compact and the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty.  
The few works that address the Salinity Crisis itself spend little more than ten 
pages on this crucial moment in the history of both the Colorado River and international 
relations between the United States and Mexico. Most offer short synopses of the crisis 
and highlight the key figures, dates, and pieces of legislation that led to its resolution.  
Such works are often more general histories of water in the American West, including 
works by noted scholars Norris Hundley, Jr., and Marc Reisner.22 Of the works that delve 
into the specifics of this water war, most do so unilaterally, focusing on U.S. actions at 
the national level. Mexican national politics and, most significantly, campesino 
involvement are given more weight in Mexican historiographies but remain peripheral to 
U.S. historiographies. For example, Phillip L. Fradkin, in his work A River No More: The 
Colorado River and the West, lends one sentence to campesino mobilization, though he 
details very well the Nixon administration’s role in the Salinity Crisis.23 
Mexican historiography is even more limited but does give sizable attention to 
Mexicali campesino efforts, though more so to memorialize the story of the farmers 
within the greater Mexican narrative of popular protest and the legacy of the Mexican 
Revolution. These works also often champion the Mexican Federal Government for its 
                                                
21 A filibuster settlement in this context refers to a settlement of U.S. frontiersmen established through 
illegal means, sometimes including military aggression, in Mexican territories. U.S. filibusters also 
occupied territories in the American West as well. The act of “filibustering” is an extension of “Manifest 
Destiny” philosophy, which validates unchecked U.S. expansionism.  
22 Norris Hundley, Jr., Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy Between the United States and 
Mexico (Berkeley, California: University of California Press: 1966); Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: the 
American West and its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin Book USA, Inc., 1993).  






ultimate support of the Mexicali effort. Celso Aguirre Bernal’s Compendio histórico-
biográfico de Mexicali, 1539-1966 does just this.24 While these histories reveal much 
about how the Mexican people remember the crisis and viewed the events of the crisis as 
they transpired, they rarely examine the actions of Mexicali campesinos and the Mexican 
Federal Government with greater profundity. Mexican historiographies tend to 
erroneously give equal weight to the impact of the Mexican Federal Government and 
campesino activism in shaping the outcome of the Salinity Crisis. Historiographies 
exaggerate the overall role of the Mexican Federal Government and its support of 
campesino protests especially in the earliest years of the crisis. I will demonstrate that 
Mexicali campesino activism proved the most significant determining factor in the fate of 
Mexico’s Colorado River water allotment, despite the flattering portrayal of the Federal 
Government in Mexican historiography.  
Evan R. Ward’s work, Border Oasis: Water and the Political Ecology of the 
Colorado River Delta, 1940-1975, is overall the most comprehensive work of 
historiography on the Salinity Crisis.25 Ward presents a fairly inclusive portrait of the 
crisis and particularly succeeds in illuminating the regional political landscapes of 
Arizona and the Mexicali Valley. Ward argues, “Arizona officials played a leading role 
in the environmental imbroglio that eventually soured international relations,”26 a subject 
marginalized in the works of other historians. However, Ward fails to connect campesino 
mobilization to the advancements in international diplomacy that eventually resolved the 
                                                
24 Celso Aguirre Bernal, Compendio histórico-biográfico de Mexicali, 1539-1966, vol. 1 (Mexicali: Escudo 
de Mexicali, 1968).  
25 Ward, Border Oasis.  





crisis; Ward focuses on the successes of one campesino leader, Alfonso Garzón, but 
overlooks the effects of large-scale demonstrations on U.S. policies.  
Further, no researchers have used the presidential archives of the John F. Kennedy 
to understand how campesino protest provoked some of the most significant advances in 
the resolution of the crisis by engaging Kennedy. In conclusion, few experts address the 
Salinity Crisis bi-nationally and most ignore the direct impact of campesino efforts on 
international diplomacy. In an effort to combat this trend, which leaves critical holes in 
the study of the Salinity Crisis, this work aims to shed light on the essentiality of 
campesino protest. In doing so, this thesis unifies the efforts of local grassroots 































I. A Tradition of Popular Protest: the Mexicali Campesino 
 
 This first chapter begins by situating the Salinity Crisis within Mexicali history, 
addressing the pivotal role of the campesino in the political and social evolution of the 
Mexicali Valley.  This chapter then focuses on the actions of Mexicali campesinos and 
their political representatives in the first four months of the Salinity Crisis, namely 
October 1961 through January 1962. In order to understand the Salinity Crisis as a 
watershed moment of international diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Mexico, one must first understand the significance of the crisis internally, within the 
larger historical narratives of the Mexicali community and the Mexican nation. 
 
Who Was the Mexicali Campesino? 
Born of the Mexican Revolution, Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution 
declared all lands and natural resources within Mexico’s borders property of the Mexican 
government and people. This article legalized the expropriation of any lands and 
resources owned by foreign companies and individuals and also outlined a land 
redistribution program.27 Of the many reasons for rebellion among the Mexican people, 
one of the strongest arguments for new leadership was the exploitation of the campesino. 
Hacendados, or wealthy large landowners, particularly during the presidency of Porfirio 
Díaz (roughly 1876-1911), frequently and illegally absorbed campesino lands, enlarging 
their wealth and power at the expense of the unrepresented majority. In order to curb such 
manipulation, Article 27 ratified a new pattern of land allotment aimed at breaking down 
large land holdings and designating a plot of land within communally owned ejidos for 
                                                






each campesino and his family. This pattern of land use, known as the “Ejido System,” 
became an integral part of governmental land use policy focused on the peasant and 
subsistence cultivation.   
However, at the time of the Revolution, Mexicali and what would later become 
the state of Baja California were sparsely populated with very few settlements. 
Additionally, despite the 1917 Constitution, Mexican governmental policy maintained a 
heavily Porfirian approach to economics, struggling for self-definition after the bloody 
and tumultuous years of the revolution. Economically weak, the government favored 
foreign investment and sought to protect externally owned companies rather than 
expropriate lands and natural resources. I recall the pioneer story of Tío Isaac and Juan 
that introduced this thesis and the empty and untamed frontier they encountered in the 
late 1800s upon reaching what is present-day Mexicali. At the time of such early 
settlement, the Cocopah Indians were largely gone from the territories and only a few 
daring individuals inhabited these desert lands. The mighty Colorado provided the liquid 
gold that turned mineral rich earth from sand to farmland. Yet, controlling El Río and 
making that dream a reality was no easy feat.  
In 1904, Colorado River Land Company (CRLC), controlled by U.S. investors, 
owned the majority of land and water rights to the Colorado River in the Mexicali Valley 
and represented the primary developing agent with some scattered campesino settlers. 
The U.S. Federal Government took interest in the growth of agricultural production in 
Mexicali along with that of the Imperial Valley, CA during the administration of 
Theodore Roosevelt. Such efforts sought to integrate Mexicali into the regional economy 





lands until 1937, when the territories were expropriated during the Lázaro Cárdenas 
administration (1934-1940). Why the delay of twenty years between Article 27 and actual 
expropriation in Baja California? Dorothy Kerig Peirson writes that the investment 
needed to transform Mexicali into a productive agricultural center was too great an 
expense for the young Mexican government following the unstable years of the 
revolution. Instead, Mexican leaders allowed U.S. interests to pour money into the valley 
and develop the region with the vision of one day reclaiming Mexicali lands, already 
outfitted by U.S. capital with the necessary infrastructures to make the land profitable. 
Further, retroactive enforcement of Article 27 of the Constitution was less than desirable 
for Mexico, which was trying to expand its economic relations with the United States.   
However, the CRLC was not universally met with open arms, particularly by 
Mexicali campesinos forced to work for an American company on Mexican land even 
after the promises of the revolutionary constitution. Without an official avenue to 
advocate for expropriation of CRLC lands, campesinos turned to grassroots mobilization 
to make their objections heard. Campesino protests reached a peak during the 1920s with 
the “Movement of Magaña” when Mexican farmers organized sit-ins on CRLC property. 
Campesinos called the CRLC imperialists.28 The CRLC retaliated, arguing that occupiers 
were “rojillos” or communists29 and Mexican governmental officials punished 
campesinos, culminating in the imprisonment of the leaders of the movement for several 
months in 1930. 30 
                                                
28 An proponent of Mexican settlement in Baja California, Pablo Herrera Carillo wrote the following 
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extranjeros eran una suente de esclavos en su propia tierra” or “Mexicans who work for foreigners are like 
slaves in their own land;” Bernal, Compendio, 311. 
29 Bernal, Compendio, 314.  





 By 1937, however, presidential policies had shifted from the belief “that 
construction of Mexico’s ‘path to modernity’ required massive foreign investment,”31 
emblematic of the legacy of Díaz, and towards the “Mexicanization” of the northwestern 
territories under Cárdenas. Cárdenas sought to retake the lands and resources of Baja 
California for the Mexican people and campaigned for Mexicans to move west and 
colonize the valley. Cárdenas also believed that opening up Baja California to Mexican 
settlers would entice citizens who had crossed the border into the Southwest United 
States as migrant farm workers to return to Mexico, enriching the agricultural economy 
of the region for the Mexican nation, not for the benefit of U.S. investors. However, 
Cárdenas’ proposal for expropriation in Mexicali, which included the nationalization of 
the natural resources and infrastructure in the valley and the creation of banks specifically 
to finance ejido farmers, offered campesinos too little land. January 27 became an annual 
holiday known as “Asalto de las Tierras” or “Assault on the Lands,” commemorating the 
day in 1937 when 5,000 campesinos marched the streets of Mexicali, protesting for larger 
land plots and faster expropriation. This period of “Mexicanization” and the annual 
celebration of “Asalto de las Tierras” vilified the Porfirian vision of land development 
and the subsequent presidencies that honored U.S. investment in the Mexicali Valley, 
arguing such policies were anti-campesino and, thus, anti-Mexican.32  Less than twenty-
five years later, salinity provoked the same anti-imperialist rhetoric by Mexican actors 
and similar accusations from the U.S. side of “rojillo” or communist influence along the 
southern border.  
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 Agricultural boom characterized the years of the 1940s and 1950s following 
expropriation in the Mexicali Valley. Three months after the appropriations of CRLC 
land in 1937, Cárdenas distributed approximately 100,000 hectares of Mexicali farmland 
between 44 ejidos and 4,382 families. 36 of these ejidos received financing from the 
Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal de Mexicali (National Bank of Ejido Credit in 
Mexicali).33 Campesinos now comprised 76% of the agriculturalists in Mexicali with the 
other 24% being colonos, a wealthier class of Mexican agriculturalists with private titles 
to individual land plots larger than those of campesinos. National funds poured into the 
valley; the Comisión Nacional de Irrigación (The National Irrigation Commission) 
invested a total of 299 million Mexican pesos between 1937 and 1956, putting roughly 
240,000 more hectares of land into production, more than doubling the total land under 
cultivation in the valley. In 1944, the United States and Mexico signed the Mexican 
Water Treaty, securing 1.5 MAFY of water, the majority of which met the agricultural 
needs of the Mexicali Valley. Cotton became the primary crop in the valley, making up 
over 90% of agricultural production. By 1960, production had nearly reached 500,000 
bales of cotton per year, a figure competitive with Yuma Valley and Imperial Valley, CA 
cotton production levels.  Secondary crops included wheat, alfalfa and some fruits and 
vegetables.34  
Population increase followed this economic boom when Mexican nationals 
migrated from other parts of the country to reap the profits of this new cotton empire. The 
population of the valley had reached about 400,000 by 1960 and over half of the residents 
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had immigrated to Baja California since 1940.35 In 1942, Mexicali became an attraction 
for another kind of migration as a way station for the Bracero Program. A series of 
temporary laws and agreements between the United States and Mexico, the Bracero 
Program allowed the United States to meet its labor needs during WWII through the 
large-scale importation of Mexican contractual laborers. Mexicali served as a checkpoint 
for Mexican migrant workers crossing the border until the end of the initiative in 1964. 
Considered Mexico’s way of supporting the war effort and symbolic of Mexico’s strong 
friendship with the United States, the Bracero Program nonetheless allowed for the 
extensive exploitation of Mexican migrant workers by their American employers. This 
increased rising tensions between the Mexicali and the Yuma and Imperial Valleys, 
prominent destinations for Mexicans crossing the border to work as agricultural laborers.  
The nation’s third most prominent producer of cotton, the Mexicali Valley 
seemed like the ultimate campesino success story after the challenging years prior to 
expropriation. However, as Téllez explains in Agricultura y Migración en el Valle de 
Mexicali, though campesinos comprised the majority of landowners in the Mexicali 
Valley at the time of expropriation, the colono sector grew in the decades after the 
Cárdenas expropriation while the campesino sector plateaued and did not put more land 
under cultivation. Campesinos in the valley also faced difficulties acquiring financing 
through the ejido banks and with the unit price for cotton, determined by the Mexican 
Federal Government. Combined with the pressing need for improvements in irrigation 
and drainage infrastructure, these elements presented major impediments to the future 
                                                





rapid growth of the valley and the campesino sector.36 Campesinos again took to the 
streets to advocate for their needs in a series of marches.37  
Regardless, the Mexicali Valley was a rising star in the Mexican nation and a new 
competitor for the Yuma and Imperial Valleys when the Salinity Crisis hit. The speed and 
scale with which new land came under development in Mexicali required massive 
increases in water deliveries, heightening the necessity of efficient water delivery from 
the Colorado. In their fervor to compete with U.S. cotton production on the world market, 
the Mexican Federal Government allowed for the overdevelopment of Mexicali, 
challenging the limits of the 1.5 MAFY allotment. All of these mounting tensions came 
to a dangerous height during the Salinity Crisis when Yuma Valley wastewater practices 
made Colorado River water unusable for Mexicali farmers.  
 
Unacceptably Salty: Mexican Responses to Salinity  
On November 9, 1961, the Mexican Federal Government officially lodged the 
first formal complaint against the increased salinity of Colorado River waters destined for 
Mexicali. Campesinos, frustrated by poor water quality, voiced their concerns to their 
representatives. The Mexican Ambassador Carillo Flores and the Mexican Commissioner 
of CILA responded, addressing their complaints to the U.S. Department of State. Though 
the salinity of Mexico’s apportionment of Colorado River water had been gradually 
                                                
36 Tellez also notes that campesino agriculture in the Mexicali Valley differed from the rest of the nation 
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California (Partido Acción Nacional: Mexico, 1964), University of California at San Diego, Mandeville 
Special Collections Library, Archival Collections, 13.  
37 The Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) or the Mexican Communist Party did not organize these 
protests over credit and cotton prices but did show its solidarity for the campesino cause by participating in 
demonstrations and spreading awareness of campesino needs. This was all before 1958 when the PRI 
raided PCM headquarters and dissolved the strength of the party for several years; Columbia University, 





increasing since 1960 with the initiation of new Yuma wastewater practices, Mexicali 
crops were not significantly threatened until fall of 1961. This is largely because the 
Mexican apportionment was not evenly dispensed throughout the course of each year. 
Instead, Mexicali received more water during the height of growing season and less water 
during times of the year characterized by lapses in production. Therefore, during fall and 
winter when the planting season for cotton had passed, Mexico received fewer Colorado 
River waters. This meant that from September to early November, Mexicali campesinos 
began to feel the effects of the salty water on their second most lucrative crop, wheat, 
with less pure water to dilute the wastewater Yuma was sending downstream.  
What then ensued was a battle of interpretation over both the explicit and implicit 
terms of the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty, beginning with the formal protest of November 
9. In the petition, the Mexican Ambassador and Commissioner argued that the high saline 
flows Mexicali farmers were receiving violated the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty, stating: 
The initial paragraph of this Treaty mentions, as a basis for the entire treaty, ‘a 
spirit of cordiality and friendly cooperation’ in the exploitation of the waters of 
the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers for use and consumption ‘in order to obtain 
the most complete and satisfactory utilization thereof…’38  
 
If the United States could not insure “satisfactory utilization” for Mexican users, Mexican 
representatives felt their northern neighbor had broken the “spirit of friendly cooperation” 
that served as the basis for the Treaty.39 The document of protest also declared the United 
States in violation of Article 3 of the Treaty, a provision that implies Mexican receipts of 
Colorado water must be viable for certain uses. The United States countered, citing 
Mexican water allotment could in fact come “from any and all sources” and from 
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“whatever origin,” Articles 11 and 12 of the 1944 Treaty respectively.40 U.S. officials 
considered these clauses explicit sanctioning of Yuma wastewater practices, arguing that 
according to these articles the 1944 Treaty guaranteed Mexico only a particular quantity, 
not quality of river water.   
The Mexican complaint did not stop with the 1944 Treaty but further deemed 
U.S. actions in conflict with International Water Law, which directly states one riparian 
river water user cannot contaminate the source of another riparian user.41 In fact, Mexico 
threatened the United States with a lawsuit in International Court if the United States 
remained noncompliant with Mexican demands to end the contamination. U.S. officials 
expressed a reluctance to do so, stating Yuma farmers would likely sue if their 
agricultural production suffered as a result. Mexican officials found this justification for 
U.S. inaction and delay neither compelling nor valid, responding this “in no way justifies 
[U.S.] right to cause Mexican farmers loss or damage.”42 Mexican representatives argued 
U.S. actions ruptured the existing harmony between the two nations, undermining the 
collaborative nature that defined many contemporary U.S.-Mexico projects such as the 
co-sponsored construction of dams on the Colorado.  
Despite such threats, the United States remained steadfast, refusing to assume 
responsibility for causing the crisis and terminate contamination. The United States 
remained unyielding until Mexicali campesinos themselves made their grievances known 
through demonstrations and the popular press. Shortly after Mexican governmental 
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representatives submitted their official protests, activist groups within the Mexicali 
community began to send letters of complaint to the U.S. Department of State and to the 
local government of Arizona as well. One of these petitions came from the Comité 
Coordinator de la Iniciative Privada de Mexicali (Committee for the Coordination of 
Private Initiative of Mexicali),43 a coalition of local businessmen and colonos, to the U.S. 
Ambassador to Mexico Thomas Mann. In this telegram of November 29, the Comité 
Privada decries U.S. inaction:  
Su gobierno inhumana e indebidamente está reteniendo agua utilizable del Río 
Colorado para consume exclusivo de su país sustituyéndola con aguas de drenaje 
contaminadas para entrega a México. Consideramos que la actitud de su gobierno 
constituye acto de privación de derechos y de agresión contra el pueblo de este 
valle.44 
 
In early December protests broke out in the local Mexicali press when the 
newspaper ABC published a full-page article entitled “A La Opinión Publica,” a call-to-
arms to the Mexicali public. The publication exposed the crisis, defended the Mexican 
government’s formal protest, and addressed the U.S. government, saying, “Esta es la 
oportunidad de que el Gobierno Americano demuestre su amistad."45 The article 
demonstrated the severity of the crisis for Mexicali: “Si esta situación no se corrige 
rápidamente puede perderse en su totalidad la cosecha de trigo de este año y continuar 
dicha contaminación, los Valles de Mexicali y San Luis se convertirán en un desierto de 
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sal.”46 This language revealed a fear of both short-term economic losses due to salinity 
but also of the potential landless destitution of Mexicali residents if salt pollution 
continued unchecked.  
A week after this rallying address, Mexicali campesinos took to the streets, 
demonstrating in front of the U.S. Consulate in Mexicali under the leadership of Alfonso 
Garzón, the President of the Liga Agraria Estatal (State Agrarian League), a newly 
formed organization created in defense of campesino interests in Baja California.47 
Garzón would become a key leader of campesino protest throughout the Salinity Crisis, 
though U.S. and Mexican actors alike, including Comité Privada members, would 
criticize him for adopting the salinity platform to further his own political goals. 
Nonetheless, Garzón served as perhaps the most powerful mobilizing figure of the 
Mexicali populace. On December 13, Garzón marched in front of the American 
Consulate in Mexicali, leading roughly 400 Mexicali residents behind him, addressing 
the crowd with the words of President López Mateos who said, “Mexico begins with Baja 
California.”48 Garzón added, “but…if the salt water was not stopped, the end of Mexico 
would begin in Baja California.”49  
The next day another protest took place, organized by the Comité Privada and 
heavily advertised in the local press, of roughly 6,000-10,000 participants according to 
the American Consulate, 20,000 according to the Mexico City Press and 35,000 
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according to some historiography.50 In a Foreign Service Despatch sent to the U.S. 
Department of State, the American Consulate in Mexicali recorded the messages of 
eleven different banners demonstrators used at the December 14 protest. These banners 
emphasized the themes of respect, justice, and world piece contained the key phrases 
“Inter-American solidarity,” “Alliance for Progress,” and “Good neighborliness.”51 The 
Mexican press quickly gravitated toward the protests and the national newspaper 
Excelsior published a full-page open letter “calling upon [President] López Mateos to 
intervene directly and personally with President Kennedy to correct this situation” and, 
like ABC before, warning that the saline waters were “threatening to convert the region 
into an ‘enormous desert of salt.’”52  
Early Mexicali protests, though characterized by political fractions, soon unified 
as the factions reorganized to form the Comité de Defensa del Pueblo de Baja California 
(Committee for the Defense of the People of Baja California). 53 While the more 
conservative business oriented Comité Privada differed from the left-leaning, agrarian-
focused Garzón and the Liga, these short-lived divisions certainly did not detract from the 
successes of the massive demonstrations.54 Though, they did reflect economic and social 
divisions within the Mexicali agriculture sector between colonos and campesinos. In fact, 
the Comité Privada even occasionally tipped-off the American Embassy in Mexicali 
when a leftist or communist association intended to show up at a campesino protest 
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uninvited. Presumably, colonos and other private businessmen in Mexicali saw the merits 
of both the mobilizing rhetoric of the campesino protests but also the need to stabilize the 
political landscape of Mexicali.  
The far-reaching effects of campesino protests were publically visible in the 
regional and national press. The bold letter to President López Mateos in the very 
prominent and conservative-leaning periodical Excelsior alone demonstrates the 
extensive success of these initial marches in gaining support across the Mexican political 
and economic spectrum. On December 15, Mexico began to bypass the highly saline 
waters of the nation’s Colorado water allotment into the Sea of Cortés rather than let 
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II. Pass the Salt: U.S. Delay 
For as long as possible, the United States responded to Mexican objections and 
indemnification with denial and inaction. However, the campesino protests perpetuated 
tensions between the two nations to the point where the U.S. Federal Government could 
no longer ignore Mexican complaints.  
 
We should face up to the fact that the Wellton-Mohawk salinity problem was not created 
by an act of God. It was deliberately created by us on the theory that because the 1944 
Colorado Water Treaty is silent on the issue of quality, the United States had no 
obligation to use reasonable care to avoid unnecessary injury to a lower riparian user.56 
 
The excerpt above from a telegram to Secretary of State Edwin McCammon 
Martin from U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Thomas Mann exposes how the United States 
initially refused to accept accountability for salinity but then reversed course and 
acknowledged its obligation to improve water quality for Mexican farmers. Mann began 
his telegram dated August 22, 1963: “Urgent and important decisions are necessary 
concerning the salt water problem which continues to be the number one issue in our 
relations with Mexico.”57 By this time, the state of affairs with Mexico had deteriorated to 
such an extent as to warrant this blunt discussion of U.S. culpability and the growing 
need for action. The confession continued:  
According to this theory [the initial U.S. interpretation of the 1944 Treaty], we 
are, in consequence, free to dump on the Mexicali Valley over an estimated 20 
year period the highly saline Wellton-Mohawk underground lake and gradually to 
replace those underground waters with water of a better quality…The fact is that 
the Wellton-Mohawk is pumping out and sending down to Mexico nearly four 
times as much salt as would normally be required for successful irrigation 
operations. There is no way to disguise this hard fact or the additional fact that 
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gradually but inevitably the productivity of the soil of the Mexicali Valley will be 
seriously impaired if the water is used.58 
 
What characterized the U.S. response to salinity at the very onset of the crisis and 
what events transpired that provoked Mann to write such a desperate telegram? To 
answer these questions, we must further explore U.S. responses to the Mexican Federal 
Government’s first official letters of protest. 
On October 17, 1961, IBWC Commissioner L.H. Hewitt wrote to Robert M. 
Sayre, the State Department Officer in Charge of Mexican Affairs, regarding a complaint 
from the CILA Mexican Commissioner that the salt content of Mexico’s water allotment 
was too high for crop production.59 Commissioner Hewitt energetically offered several 
measures for the immediate improvement of Mexican water quality; Hewitt suggested the 
Bureau of Reclamation, within the Department of the Interior, discontinue pumping 4,000 
ppm waters from Yuma wells and release additional Colorado River water to Mexico for 
dilution purposes.60 Sayre’s response condemned any such conciliatory actions; Sayre 
replied that shutting down the pumping of well waters would not help the situation and 
would instead “arouse the severest criticism” from U.S. Colorado River water users.61 
Sayre refocused the discourse on the measures that Mexico might take to improve their 
water supply without U.S. concessions that could potentially undermine the benefits 
Yuma farmers enjoyed through current wastewater practice.62 This reveals how, at the 
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onset of the crisis, the Department of State prioritized the needs of Arizona and the Basin 
States over those of Mexican water users.  
A memorandum of a telephone call from the IBWC Secretary to the Department 
of Interior confirmed Sayre’s “‘strong position opposing any action’ on the U.S. 
side…because this would imply a responsibility on our part to deliver water of a quality 
desired by Mexico.”63 Further, the U.S. section of the IBWC was advised not to 
participate in any investigation of the effects of the saline water on Mexican crops as, 
“this would be outside the responsibility of the Commission…[which was] only to see 
that Mexico receives the quantity of water specified in the treaty.”64 According to the 
Department of Interior, Mexico could: use well water instead of river water in the winter 
when low flows from the Colorado made the water Mexico received less diluted and, 
therefore, more saline; ask for an advance on their 1962 Colorado River allotment to 
increase dilution; or begin growing more salt-tolerant crops instead of cotton.65 These 
proposals, particularly the first and last, were not small feats. Such measures would have 
involved almost the complete restructuring of Mexicali farming and irrigation practices, 
which would have been a daunting challenge for campesino agriculture. Such suggestions 
reflected the Bureau of Reclamation’s refusal to take responsibility for Yuma’s 
wastewater practices or make concessions to aid Mexicali farmers, even those that would 
not disrupt U.S. farming practices such as releasing greater amounts of water for dilution.  
This series of exchanges reveals clear differences in the responses of the IBWC 
and the Bureau of Reclamation. In these initial correspondences, Sayre and the 
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Department of State deferred to the Bureau of Reclamation, prioritizing the preservation 
of internal domestic relations with the Basin States. Because of its inherent bi-national 
focus and structure, the IBWC approached salinity with a greater understanding of 
Mexican needs and with a stronger impetus for and willingness to reach agreement with 
Mexico. The regional and stubbornly insular Bureau of Reclamation focused instead on 
meeting the needs of Arizona and Basin States throughout the crisis, often in spite of the 
international climate.  
  Such resistance by the Bureau of Reclamation and the Basin States, with the 
backing of Congress, greatly hindered the progress of international negotiations 
throughout the crisis. These regional bodies feared that conceding too much to Mexico 
too readily would give precedence to the future needs of Mexico on the lower Colorado 
above those of U.S. users. Arizona Senator Carl Hayden played a particularly important 
role in defending Arizona’s future interests in Colorado River water. Senator Hayden, a 
longtime supporter of Yuma Valley farming, alleged that meeting Mexican demands now 
could lead to the forfeiture of some of Arizona’s water allotment to their downstream 
neighbor.66 In fact, many throughout the Basin States believed that Mexico was merely 
using the Salinity Crisis to enhance the quantity of its water allotment.  
However, campesino protests on the border elevated the international importance 
of the Salinity Crisis, forcing the U.S. Federal Government to prioritize relations with 
Mexico over the interests of the Basin States. In turn, local Arizona agriculturalists and 
their representatives felt slighted by the U.S. Federal Government. Ward writes that 
Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District “administrators felt victimized by the 
                                                





tendency of national leaders to give precedence to cordial relations with Mexico over the 
resolution of the [Yuma] Valley’s environmental and economic problems.”67 
Representing the District, William A. Couple led a White House official on a tour of the 
Yuma Valley. Couple sarcastically reported in a letter to Senator Hayden, “I gather the 
impression that he [the White House official] was more sympathetic with the ‘poor 
Mexicans’ than with the ‘rich Americans.’”68 This sense of victimization only incensed 
local residents and officials to further advocate their cause and refuse acquiescence to 
Mexican needs.69 
 When it became apparent to the U.S. Federal Government that there were greater 
things at stake than the appeasement of the Basin States, the cracks in the U.S. position of 
denial began to show. By early 1962, the Bureau of Reclamation had begun releasing 
additional waters downstream to dilute the salinity of waters reaching Mexico. A mid-
January telephone conversation between A. B. West of the Bureau of Reclamation and 
IBWC Commissioner Hewitt manifested burgeoning U.S. recognition of the mounting 
crisis. Mexico claimed that U.S. efforts to ameliorate the situation, namely the amount of 
additional waters delivered to Mexico for dilution purposes, were insufficient. West 
expressed the Bureau “felt there was more water [for dilution] being delivered than the 
Mexicans were willing to admit,” again revealing the reluctance of Bureau officials to 
make concessions to Mexico.70 At the time, water was being released at rates anywhere 
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from 1,510 second-feet to 2,190 second-feet but failing to reach the 2,300 second-feet 
rate of release requested by Mexico. Essentially, the saline waters were not being 
properly diluted. Upon learning of such discrepancy, West assured Hewitt: 
He had not realized that deliveries were far short [and]…said he realized the  
international situation was acute and that, unless he was instructed by Washington 
to the contrary, he would release sufficient water so as to be sure that Mexico gets 
the amount to which it is entitled…this would result in some over-supply; 
however, he felt that conditions were such that he would be justified in taking 
such action.71  
 
By this point, James W. Boyd of the American Embassy in Mexicali had begun 
reporting that several local Mexicali officials and organizations of liberal and communist 
backgrounds were taking advantage of the crisis to further their own agendas. In fact, the 
fear of communist insurgents leading the campesino movement appeared and reappeared 
in the writings of U.S. officials and the public despite its stark absence from the Mexican 
governmental and campesino accounts. This American preoccupation with communist 
sympathies at the border contrasted with the reactions of the larger Mexican public which 
focused on both the potential consequences of salinity for economic progress and 
international friendship with the United States. Regardless, the visible campesino 
objection to salinity and this preoccupation with the role of subversive communist forces 
in the protests galvanized U.S. Federal officials to change their policies and seek out 
immediate, though temporary, solutions to the high saline conditions of the water supply.  
As they began to address the concerns of Mexicali agriculturalists and provide 
water for dilutions, U.S. officials emphasized practical versus legal solutions to the crisis. 
Eager to avoid International Court and also the obligation to change Yuma wastewater 
management, U.S. authorities reinforced the merits of the practical measures Mexico 
                                                





could take in order to be able to use the polluted waters over the long-term, such as 
enhancing water infrastructure and agrarian practices.  
By suggesting Mexico focus on the practical, U.S. officials also implied Mexico’s 
responses to salinity were excessively emotional versus rational. According to one U.S. 
report, the Mexican Ambassador “again converted the problem into an emergency.”72 A 
resolution in International Court could take any number of months or years. Conversely, 
increasing waters for dilution or building infrastructures could have more immediate 
significance and, thus, serve as more practical solutions to the crisis. Mexico would most 
certainly have succeeded according to International Water Laws had the case gone to 
International Court, in spite of any interpretation of the Treaty of 1944.73 Therefore, 
Mexican threats, especially in light of U.S. delays, were not exaggerated nor overly 
emotional but circumstantially appropriate. By characterizing Mexican responses as 
irrational or extreme, U.S. officials attempted to diminish the severity of the crisis and 
justify U.S. inaction.  
Efforts by U.S. officials to ignore the validity of Mexican legal claims and their 
implications – that the United States would be found guilty in International Court – 
demonstrate the limits of U.S. willingness to participate in a solution. U.S. authorities 
realized the need to address this crisis because of its political implications, structuring 
their rhetoric to appear disposed to negotiate. However, they resisted as much as possible 
investing U.S. dollars, or risking U.S. dollars in the form of Yuma agricultural 
                                                
72 Mr. Crimmins to Mr. Woodward, February 16, 1962, United States Government Memorandum, NACP, 
RG 59, DF, 1960-63, 611.12322/2-1662.  
73 Aside, from potentially gaining concessions on the salinity issue, Mexico could jeopardize U.S. 
economic investment, the Alliance for Progress and other bi-national initiatives by taking the case to 
International Court. Both nations, therefore, saw the benefits of solving the crisis without the intervention 






production, to end the contamination. Even as the U.S. began to pump waters for dilution 













































III. Of Caravan & Commies: Engaging President Kennedy 
 On February 16, 1962, the Salt Caravan erupted to a degree where the force of 
campesino objections meant U.S. action could no longer be forestalled. February 16 
marked the day when the U.S. Federal Government recognized salinity not as a minor 
diplomacy issue but as an international relations emergency that required a bi-national 
solution to the crisis. The Salt Caravan sparked the interest of President John F. Kennedy 
who in turn completely shifted the dynamics of negotiation by accepting accountability 
for Yuma Valley actions.  
On February 7, Garzón and the Liga left their encampment in front of the 
American Consulate in Mexicali and traveled over 450 miles into the heart of the nation, 
taking their protest to Mexico City. On February 16, 220 members arrived via bus, and 40 
more via car to take part in what became known as the Salt Caravan.74 More significant 
than the size of the protest was the number of miles and days traveled by campesinos and 
their allies to make their grievances known to their government, the Mexican nation, the 
United States and the greater global community. Upon reaching the capital, Mexicali 
campesinos were joined by sympathizers in demonstrations in front of the American 
Consulate in Mexico City. Protestors distributed flyers to educate the Mexican public 
about the Salinity Crisis. The U.S. press, both newspaper and television, captured an 
attempt thwarted by Mexican police of more than 7,000 protestors to return their U.S. 
work visas along with a card signed by each demonstrator which read, “No podemos 
considerar amigo a un gobierno que arroja los desechos de sus aguas a nuestras tierras, 
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con grave perjuicio a nuestra economía…”75 The seriousness of such demonstrations 
provoked responses from Mexican representatives, U.S. officials, and, most significantly, 
President Kennedy who by March 1962 played an active role in finding a solution to this 
ever-pressing international dilemma. 
 Mexican President López Mateos announced a $81 million plan to rescue the 
Mexicali Valley from salinity and improve its infrastructure over the next five years, but 
felt the plan could not be fully implemented without assurance from the United States 
that water salinity would decrease.76 When the Salt Caravan lasted into early March, the 
White House asked on behalf of President Kennedy for a memorandum on the crisis. The 
introduction to the requested memorandum read as such: 
Political emotions on this issue are running high in Mexico. The Department [of 
State] has concluded that our relations with Mexico are so severely strained that 
immediate action is required to avoid serious damage. There is a possibility that 
Mexico could successfully carry the issue to International Court…the political 
temper in Mexico is such that Mexico will soon be required to take such a step 
unless constructive action is taken by the United States.77 
 
The memorandum further reported that lack of advance notice about changes in Yuma 
wastewater practices deeply contributed to the feeling within Mexico “that [the] 400,000 
acre irrigation district in the Mexicali Valley and the 300,000 people settled in the Valley 
from all over Mexico [were] being sacrificed to help the 75,000 acre Wellton-Mohawk 
irrigation district with its 6,000 people.”78 The report mentioned negotiations had reached 
a stalemate, as the U.S. Basin States believed Mexico was trying to steal their water by 
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exaggerating the crisis. Additionally, the memorandum emphasized the coming fall, 
precisely October 1962, when Mexico would face the seasonal reduction in the amount of 
water they received which would worsen the effects of the salt pollution.  
Upon receiving this memorandum, President Kennedy delineated a clear calendar, 
which he expected all involved agencies to follow precisely in order to find solutions to 
the crisis and assuage the Mexican public. The State Department made all efforts to 
refute the popular perception that the United States was delaying. The U.S. Basin States 
continued to exert pressure on the Federal Government to slow down the process, fearful 
that the excited Mexican public would push the U.S. government into making hasty 
decisions to the detriment of Arizona farmers. The White House was then flooded with 
letters from the Basin State governors and senators, but the international situation proved 
more critical.79 A State Department correspondence read, “Violence has so far been 
avoided only because the Mexican Government has urged moderation on its people and 
restrained violence. We cannot expect this policy to continue if we do not reach prompt 
accommodation with Mexico.”80 President Kennedy began discussing solutions to salinity 
with President López Mateos in mid-March, gave the IBWC 45 days to render a report 
with solutions that could be implemented before October of 1963, and scheduled a visit 
to Mexico for June 29, 1962.  
Additionally, by the end of March 1962 the U.S. Federal Government added a 
clause to the Alliance for Progress affirming U.S. commitment to lend the funds and 
experts necessary to Mexico in order to resolve the Salinity Crisis. Further, the U.S. 
Congress in March of 1962 approved almost $300,000 to investigate the roots of the 
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crisis. 81 Once President Kennedy became involved in resolving the Salinity Crisis, the 
United States change its initial policies and launched a full-fledged effort to save the 
international partnership between the United States and Mexico in order to maintain the 
Alliance for Progress.  
 
Hero-making: Kennedy’s Visit to Mexico  
President Kennedy’s visit to Mexico from June 29 through July 1 of 1962, in the 
company of his wife Jackie, proved the most overwhelmingly successful of these 
initiatives. In fact, “the most important tool was Kennedy himself.”82 In these short days, 
the U.S. President collaborated with President López Mateos, issuing a Joint 
Communiqué addressing salinity, and confessed the United States was at fault for the 
crisis and co-responsible for resolving it. Simultaneously, Kennedy furthered his Alliance 
for Progress, with the aim of spreading democracy in the Western Hemisphere, through 
his rhetoric and gestures of friendship.  
In Mexico City, Kennedy and López Mateos solidified efforts to ameliorate the 
salinity situation by October of 1963 in their Joint Communiqué issued on Saturday, June 
29. The document began, stating both Presidents López Mateos and Kennedy had 
conducted a series of meetings during Kennedy’s visit “which mark[ed] a new era of 
understanding and friendship between Mexico and the United States.”83 “Both Presidents 
reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the ideals of liberty and personal dignity” 
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and “fully accept[ed] the responsibility of every sovereign nation to form its own 
policies, without outside dictation or coercion,” a reference to keeping Soviet and Cuban 
influences at check in Latin America. 84 Further enforcing the U.S.-Mexico partnership 
against U.S.S.R. intrusion, the Joint Communiqué reaffirmed the agreements of the OAS 
in Punta del Este, Uruguay in August 1961. The agreement on the Salinity Crisis 
concluded the Communiqué: “They expressed their determination, with the scientific 
studies as a basis, to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time 
with the aim of preventing the recurrence of this problem by October 1963.”85 Not only 
did the Communiqué imply a true spirit of collaboration between the two leaders on the 
salinity issue but committed both governments to finding a joint and permanent solution 
to the crisis. 
In his first-hand account of the key discussion between the two presidents about 
the Salinity Crisis (the discussion was held at 11a.m. on Sunday, July 1, 1962), Secretary 
of State Martin, writes, “Kennedy followed up by confessing his belief that our Wellton-
Mohawk irrigation project should never have been approved.”86 Further, Martin relayed: 
With the conclusion to the discussion of the two major bilateral issues, on both of 
which the U.S. admitted to being the guilty party, President Kennedy in a 
characteristic but unexpected fashion asked me if there weren’t any issues on 
which Mexico rather than the U.S. was at fault.87  
 
Remarkably, the President graciously accepted complete responsibility on behalf of his 
nation for the complications due to Yuma wastewater practices.  
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 Such diplomacy choices directly reflected U.S. attempts to deflect a larger crisis 
at hand, the spreading influence of communism, in light of Mexico’s disturbing support 
of Cuba. Predating Kennedy’s visit to Mexico a newspaper report from Mexico City 
entitled “Reds Spur Riots in Mexico” read, “Rural disorders, believed [to have been] 
provoked by the Communists in connection with Kennedy’s forthcoming visit here, were 
reported in several areas today,” including a “hunger strike” in Sonora, the state adjoining 
Baja California to mainland Mexico.88 Meanwhile, in another article on the same page of 
the publication President López denied that “President Kennedy or any of his aides might 
make [any suggestions] that Mexico assume the leadership of Latin America” during 
Kennedy’s upcoming visit.89 López Mateos stated, “I don’t see the need for any ‘little 
alliance’ within the Alliance for Progress.”90 However the State Department’s 
“Memorandum on the President’s State Visit to Mexico” of June 4, 1962 stated in its 
second bullet point that “Mexico can well become the bridgehead for this country to the 
rest of Latin America, and could be a model for the successful implementation of the 
Alliance for Progress.”91 While the United States hoped Kennedy’s travel would promote 
Mexico as a liaison for the Alliance for Progress and the spread of democracy throughout 
Latin America, communist forces protested the impending visit and López Mateos 
asserted he would not be bullied into assuming an ideological leadership role in Latin 
America.  
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 Kennedy’s visit successfully assuaged “political emotions…running high in 
Mexico”92 both regarding the Salinity Crisis and Cold War diplomacy, while eliciting the 
support of the Mexican government and people for the Alliance for Progress. A television 
broadcast called Kennedy’s stay in Mexico, “one of his greatest triumphs in personal 
diplomacy.”93 It took one hour and eighteen minutes for the presidential party to travel 
the nine miles from the Mexico City airport to the home of President López Mateos 
because of the two million people assembled to greet the Kennedys. The broadcast also 
reported the travel produced “No untoward incident or anti-American sign.”94 The 
President’s opening remarks upon arrival recalled a shared history of revolution in the 
United States and Mexico, emphasizing the need for future unity, declaring, “Neither of 
our revolutions is yet complete; indeed, neither could ever be complete within the 
boundaries of a single nation” but only through a “hemisphere-wide undertaking.”95 
Kennedy proclaimed, “Together we have the power and will to show the world that a free 
democracy is the best road, the only road, to national development and national 
dignity.”96 Each act of friendship, such as admitting the United States was at fault for the 
salinity affair, meant for Kennedy a step forward towards the aforementioned 
“hemisphere-wide undertaking” to spread democracy.  
 Because of the accomplishments of this meeting and the Mexican public’s 
fascination with the U.S. President and his wife, President Kennedy became a champion 
of the Salinity Crisis and his death in November of 1963 was heavily mourned among the 
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Mexican people.97 Kennedy’s efforts reflect his commitment to improving U.S.-Mexico 
relations in the hopes of uniting the Western Hemisphere through democracy.  
 
Domestic Divide: The Basin States 
As President Kennedy made every effort to repair relations with Mexico, the 
Basin States continued to dissent from the national agenda. When the Federal 
Government realized that the Bureau of Reclamation’s errors in water management 
created the Salinity Crisis in the first place, the divide between national and regional 
interests grew even more.  
Secretary of State Martin reflects on the contradictions between federal and 
regional interests:  
Closing down our project [referring to the Gila Project] would have been the 
quickest and simplest solution technically but neither the President nor the 
Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, could prevail upon the Bureau of 
Reclamation (in the Department of the Interior) with its solid backing from the 
Congress, to consider this even though in other parts of the country most farmers 
were being paid by the government to take land out of production to reduce price-
depressing surpluses.98 
 
The shutting down of the Gila Project would not only require the United States to buy out 
Yuma farmers but also would mean a loss of roughly fifty million dollars in federal 
investments toward the construction of irrigation and drainage systems in the valley.99 
However, according to Martin, the Federal Government would have been more than 
willing to suffer the financial loss but for the resistance of the Bureau of Reclamation.  
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A document dated October 30, 1962 reveals the Federal Government’s exhausted 
sympathy with regional opinion and especially with the Bureau: “The problem [of the 
Salinity Crisis] seems to have arisen as the result of a misjudgment in the Bureau of 
Reclamation and their delay in reaching a solution may come from a desire not to 
acknowledge an error.”100 Whereas at the beginning of the crisis, federal officials 
deferred to the Bureau of Reclamation, assuming those most intimately acquainted with 
the Yuma Valley could better assess Mexican accusations and demands, the campesino 
protests of early 1962 provoked the Federal Government to make its own evaluation of 
the affairs. The same document reads:  
Our enemies have seized upon the saline problem to attack us with considerable 
success…Mexican political officials have voiced their concern. The Mexican 
press has published considerable criticism of the United States’ position and the 
people of Mexicali have staged several public demonstrations and protest 
caravans. A failure to resolve this problem will have very serious foreign relations 
repercussions for the United States.101   
 
Despite significant objection from the Basin States and their affiliates, 
negotiations at the national-international level persisted throughout the 1960s, producing 
Minutes 218, 241, and 242. The fight over salinity continued long past Kennedy’s 
administration and his assassination into the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson who, 
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IV. The Nixon-Echeverría Years 
While campesino demonstration defined the early years of the Salinity Crisis, the 
intricacies of international diplomacy between high-ranking officials almost entirely 
characterized the later years. The middle years, 1963-1966, bridged the early years 
dominated by campesino demonstrations and the later years of negotiations at the 
president’s table. During these middle years, campesinos continued to vigorously protest 
their right to parity, an equal share in the quality of Colorado River water. This forced the 
United States to uphold its commitment to resolve the crisis. Campesino actions during 
these middle years sustained attention for this issue on both sides of the border, paving 
the way for a permanent solution to salinity with the presidency of Luis Echeverría 
Álvarez in 1973. Physical demonstrations still took place in these years, however, 
protests took on a different nature: the campesino cause became a literature campaign to 
inform the national and international spheres of the ongoing problem of salinity.  
 
“La Sal No Debe Separar A Dos Pueblos Amigos” 
 The wide-ranging influence of the brochure “La Sal No Debe Separar A Dos 
Pueblos Amigos”102 or “Salt Shouldn’t Separate Friendly Peoples” epitomizes the success 
of the campesino literature campaign (see image below). Mexican Senator Gustavo 
Vildosola Almada sponsored the printing of 50,000 copies of “La Sal” in June of 1964, 
distributing them throughout Mexico to educate the rest of the country about the Salinity 
Crisis. According to an Airgram from the American Consul in Mexicali, “fifteen 
thousand copies might have been distributed to the local farmers and probably the same 
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amount has been mailed to different organizations…encouraging [them] to participate in 
nation-wide protest.”103  
With the collaboration of prominent engineer Emilio López Zamora and journalist 
and José Merino Millán well acquainted with the Salinity Crisis, “La Sal” exposed both 
the political circumstances and, importantly, the technical aspects of the crisis in great 
detail. For example, the pamphlet compared a glass of water, undrinkable because it 
contained a spoonful of salt, with a potable jug of water containing that same spoonful of 
salt. This analogy clearly demonstrated for the average citizen the consequences of the 
salt-influx due to the Yuma wastewaters and how dilution could be used to resolve the 
problem. “La Sal” also clearly synthesized for the lay public the engineering elements of 
the crisis with the use of four labeled maps and charts and showed photographs of 
agricultural land in the Mexicali Valley lying fallow due to the salt influx.  
“La Sal” functioned not only as an informational brochure but also as an appeal 
for support and activism. In his introduction entitled “Advertencia” or “Warning,” 
Senator Almada wrote the purpose of the brochure was to defend the nation, “contra 
cualquier agresión directa o indirecta que signifique un atentado a los intereses del 
país.”104 Almada continued the goal of “La Sal” was to “desp[ertar] el sentido de 
solidaridad” or awaken a sense of national solidarity.105 “La Sal” further declared the 
State of Arizona in violation of both the 1944 Treaty and International Water Law, and 
that nothing could justify U.S. actions when wastewater was harming thousands of 
Mexican families. Mexico, however, had upheld its obligations under the 1944 Treaty 
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and officials were doing their part to negotiate. In its conclusion, “La Sal” stated that the 
inability to beneficially use Mexicali land because of salinity “sería tanto como perder 
una parte del territorio nacional,” recalling U.S. territorial expansionism into Baja 
California at the turn of the century.106 Overall “La Sal,” in its content and the scope of 
its dissemination across the country, successfully facilitated national engagement in the 
Salinity Crisis.  
 The popular press followed suit, printing throughout these middle years 
informative articles, highly accusatory of the United States. The cartoon from the June 
1964 edition of “Ceteme,” the official publication of the Confederación de Trabajadores 
de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers), depicts Arizona Senator Carl Hayden 
dressed in superhero garb, pouring tons of salt on a helpless and unclothed Mexican 
agriculturalist. Other examples seen below mock the Alliance for Progress and link Yuma 
Valley’s actions to the Manifest Destiny ideology that defined turn of the century U.S. 
settlement in the Delta. These efforts to provoke both national and international activism 
through the press and other literary means placed pressure on the U.S. government to 
uphold its commitment and resolve the Salinity Crisis.  
                                                





          
Left: Cover of “La Sal” brochure. Right: Political Cartoon from the June edition of “Ceteme” which reads, 
“Una Agresión A México: 200 Mil Hectáreas Inservibles en Mexicali” or “An Aggression Against Mexico: 
200 Thousand Useless Hectares in Mexicali.”107  
 
               
Left: This image by journalist José Natividad Rosales plays on the phrase “Alliance for Progress” but 
instead deems it “SALianza para el Progress” to describe how salinity has undermined U.S.-Mexican 
partnership. Right: A political cartoon demonstrating with the use of an hourglass how it is only a matter of 
time before the U.S.A. buries Mexico in salt. The script at the top reads, "It is Manifest Destiny that the 
roosters on top always injure those on the bottom.”108  
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The Negotiation Table 
 In May of 1964, four hundred protestors marched from the Chamber of 
Commerce to the U.S. Consulate in Mexicali with a salt-filled coffin, representing the 
plight of Baja California. Abruptly in August of the same year, the Comité General de la 
Defensa del Valle de Mexicali (The Committee for the Defense of the Valley), which had 
organized the aforementioned protest, called off all future demonstrations.109 In 
anticipation of a forthcoming settlement to the crisis, the Mexican Federal Government 
had requested that they do so.110 The promise of an imminent solution to salinity 
significantly deterred campesino protest and the Comité General would not meet again 
until 1969. Though the primary setting of the Salinity Crisis would move from the fields 
and streets to the negotiation table, campesino protest had forced the two national 
governments into dialogue with one another, which would eventually produce a definitive 
solution to the Salinity Crisis.  
A solution to Colorado River water quality now entailed mediation over the 
conditions and wording of several additions to the mission of the International Boundary 
& Water Commission. These three minutes were, namely, Minute 218 (1965), Minute 
241 (1972), and Minute 242 (1973), spanning the U.S. presidencies of Johnson (1963-
1969) and Nixon (1969-1974) and the Mexican presidencies of Díaz Ordaz (1958-1964) 
and Echeverría (1970-1976).  
 On February 22, 1964, Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Adolfo López Mateos 
met in Palm Springs, California, releasing a Joint Communiqué that declared a sustained 
commitment to finding a permanent solution to salinity. Notably, during said discussion, 
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President Johnson honored former President Kennedy’s initiatives for Latin American by 
pairing discussion of the Salinity Crisis with that of the Alliance for Progress. As 
technicians of the IBWC/CILA labored intensely to find a practical resolution to saline 
waters, the focus of negotiations moved away from the “law’s delay” and any threat of a 
suit in International Court.111  
This collaboration led to the creation of Minute 218 on March 22, 1965, a five-
year agreement of provisional measures to temporarily improve water quality as much as 
possible until both nations could agree on more substantial, long-term solutions. Minute 
218 consisted of a number of measures, including the construction of a bypass channel to 
circumvent the Morelos Dam and a series of drainage wells to allow for selective 
pumping of Wellton-Mohawk drainage water during different crop seasons.112 
Additionally, the United States pledged 40,000 AF (acre-feet) of additional water 
annually from the unpolluted Imperial Dam, in excess to the 1.5 MAFY Mexico received 
as a result of the 1944 Treaty. Under this initiative, the quality of water delivered to 
Mexico between 1962 and 1971 improved from an annual average of 1500 ppm to 1240 
ppm.113 Though not designed as a permanent settlement of Salinity Crisis negotiations 
between the United States and Mexico, Minute 218 provided several temporarily 
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satisfactory measures to alleviate the strains placed on small-time Mexicali farmers by 
highly saline waters.  
 As the five years of Minute 218 began to come to a close in November of 1970, 
the United States proposed an extension of the amendment for another five-years. The 
Mexican presidency at the time of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz acquiesced to the prolongation of 
Minute 218 offered by the presidency of Richard Nixon. However, Díaz Ordaz agreed 
only in word in anticipation of the forthcoming presidency of Luis Echeverría Álvarez, to 
begin in December of that same year.  
 
 
Echeverría: Salinity as National Identity 
 
Mexico’s actions and attitudes in this case [of the Salinity Crisis] are quite in harmony 
with the new Mexican profile which the Echeverría Administration seems determined to 
create – a nationalistic Mexico, which has identified its interest with those of developing 
countries, and apparently feels a necessity to show its citizenry it will aggressively press 
its case in all matters in which it is in disagreement with the United States.114 
 
 With the advent of the Echeverría presidency, a new tone modulated U.S.-Mexico 
relations. Just as the above excerpt from a State Department assessment of Salinity Crisis 
negotiations suggests, President Echeverría associated Mexican interests with the 
developing world and Central America more than with the United States. Diverging from 
Kennedy’s vision of a united Western Hemisphere, Echeverría sought to establish himself 
as a leader capable of aggressively lodging complaints against the overpowering U.S. 
While campaigning for president in 1969, Echeverría met with Mexicali cotton farmers 
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for twelve hours to discuss their foremost concerns, particularly the quality of their 
Colorado River water. That same year, the Comité General reunited to vigorously oppose 
the renewal of Minute 218, which left many farmers dissatisfied with water quality 
improvements and without compensation for their losses due to saline waters.115 Seeing 
the Salinity Crisis as an opportunity to enhance his self-image as a defender of Mexican 
interests against the exploitive United States, Echeverría refused the renewal of Minute 
218 when he ascended to the presidency, distinguishing himself from the conciliatory 
former President Díaz Ordaz. In its place, Echeverría demanded a new addendum that 
would provide permanent solutions to water quality but allowed the extension of Minute 
218 for a short interim period until the nations could reach a more definitive agreement.  
 The Echeverría administration differed greatly from that of the preceding Díaz 
Ordaz government, using inflammatory language to incite U.S. responsiveness. 
Echeverría addressed the U.S. Congress in 1972 with the following words: “It is 
impossible to understand why the United States does not use the same boldness and 
imagination that it applies to solving complex problems with its enemies [referring to 
U.S. efforts in Vietnam] to the solution of simple problems with friends [referring to 
Salinity Crisis negotiations with Mexico].”116  The Secretary General to President 
Echeverría questioned “how a country which can put a man on the moon can fail to find 
the means to reduce effectively the salinity of waters in a given river basin.”117 Such 
accusatory language brought to the forefront of discussions just what the United States 
hoped to obfuscate from public memory: the U.S. denial at the onset of the crisis and the 
delays caused by the Basin States.  
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This very open display of displeasure by the Echeverría administration challenged 
the Nixon presidency to find a permanent solution to the crisis as soon as possible. The 
Nixon administration recognized the importance of reaching agreement with Echeverría 
in order to avoid jeopardizing other agreements with Mexico and to repair at least part of 
the fallen image of the United States, facing much global scrutiny for its foreign policy at 
the time.118  
Further, in order to combat increased salinity, both nations engaged in large-scale 
groundwater pumping. In 1944 when the Mexican Water Treaty was signed, groundwater 
was largely a non-issue. However, with increased scarcity of Colorado River water and 
concerns over water quality, both the Yuma and Mexicali Valleys began digging wells to 
supplement their allotments, drawing water from the same underground reservoir.119 U.S. 
parties recognized the need to solve the Salinity Crisis with Mexico in order to define 
groundwater rights before a pumping war between the valleys depleted the underground 
aquifer water. Thus, it was in the best interests of the United States for multiple reasons 
to reach a fast and permanent solution with Mexico.  
By this time, the Nixon presidency no longer focused on unifying the Western 
Hemisphere through the Alliance for Progress nor valued the revolutionary spirit that the 
Mexican campesino epitomized as Kennedy had. Regarding Echeverría’s attitude toward 
salinity, a memorandum exchanged between the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
Department of the Interior, and U.S. Section of the IBWC read: 
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 Recent years have witnessed the issue escalated by the Echeverría 
Administration in terms of the time allowed for the solution, the quality of the 
water demanded, and internal political importance. Mexico for reasons of its own 
has chosen to make what heretofore was a regional problem into a national 
Mexican issue, and, by Mexican definition, the principal issue in U.S.-Mexican 
relations.120 
 
This statement, though illustrative of Echeverría’s use of salinity as a political platform, 
also misrepresents the long-standing significance of the crisis for the Mexican nation. 
Campesinos, from the onset of their protests, engaged the national citizenry in their 
grievances. The Salt Caravan to Mexico City epitomizes campesino efforts to engage the 
heart of the nation in a local agrarian dispute and the mass distribution of the publication 
“La Sal” displays initiative by Mexicali residents to sustain that engagement throughout 
the duration of the crisis. The document referenced above continues: 
Although the average Mexican may not be deeply concerned over the salinity 
problem, he would readily accept it as one more example of what he understands 
to be the United States’ willful mistreatment of its smaller and poorer neighbor. 
Mexican public opinion is definitely behind President Echeverría, and, ignorant of 
the technical and legal complexities underlying the problem, shares his belief that 
Mexico should receive a quality of water similar to that delivered to the United 
States’ users just across the international boundary.121 
 
Certainly, the general Mexican public felt outraged by Yuma wastewater practices of 
which the United States failed to inform Mexico. Mexicans regarded the United States as 
prejudiced against Mexico, unconcerned with the fate of its downstream neighbors and 
focused solely on the benefits of such wastewater practices to their own citizenry. Surely 
initial U.S. denial emphatically confirmed such feelings from the disadvantaged party, 
which by definition included the greater Mexican nation that suffered the loss of Mexicali 
as a prime agricultural center and much of the water guaranteed under the 1944 Treaty. 
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These comments reflect the Nixon administration’s misunderstanding of the U.S.-Mexico 
dynamic as perceived by those across the border. Quite apart from Mexican leadership, 
the Mexican people very consistently considered the inequity of water quality between 
the Imperial, Yuma, and Mexicali valleys unacceptable and made their opinions known to 
both their domestic government and to the United States.  
 President Echeverría admittedly did bring the Salinity Crisis even more to the 
forefront of Mexican politics in order to promote himself. However, though accused by 
the U.S. State Department of provoking an outbreak of anti-American hostility, 
Echeverría simply built on existing nation-wide disapproval of U.S. actions for personal 
advantage. The Salinity Crisis was a national Mexican issue, even the principal concern 
in U.S.-Mexican affairs, long before the Echeverría presidency. The Nixon 
administration’s analyses delegitimized the nationwide efforts by campesinos and their 
allies to vocalize and advocate for a permanent solution to salinity. 
 
Brownell and a Permanent Solution 
Because of such tensions between the two presidents, nearly two years passed 
before Nixon and Echeverría met and formulated Minute 241. Though only effective 
from July 14 through December 31 of 1972, the new minute required that the United 
States bypass wastewater at twice the rate than it had under Minute 218, again without 
charging the bypassed water against the Mexican allotment, and overall reduced the 
salinity of Mexico’s diversion by 100 ppm.122 Still, Minute 241 failed to provide long-
term solutions to the problem of salinity.  
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 Finally, in August of 1972, President Nixon appointed former Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell, Jr. as his special representative to lead a Task Force specifically with 
the aim of finding permanent and effective solutions to salinity. The Task Force consisted 
of “working level representatives from a number of the major departments of 
government.”123 The members visited the Yuma Valley and also met with the Committee 
of Fourteen, representatives of the Basin States. Brownell conferred with Mexican 
officials, including President Echeverría and Mexican Foreign Secretary Emilio Óscar 
Rabasa, in addition to experts and citizens in both Mexico City and the Mexicali Valley.  
A year after their initial appointment, Brownell and his Task Force witnessed the signing 
of Minute 242, a permanent solution to the Salinity Crisis based on their research.  
 The terms of Minute 242 guaranteed a quality standard for the Mexican water 
supply from the Colorado, a convention the United States had avoided conceding 
throughout the Salinity Crisis. Even when engaging in temporary solutions to salinity, the 
United States had consistently refuted the idea of ever formalizing a quality threshold of 
its water obligation to Mexico. Minute 242 specified water headed for Mexico must meet 
an annual salinity of no more than 115 ppm more than the water of the Imperial Dam, the 
diversion point for U.S. agriculture along the border, with a potential fluctuation of plus 
or minus 30 ppm. In order to achieve said quality standard, the United States agreed to 
continue bypassing 118,000 AF annually of wastewater, extend the concrete-lining of the 
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Wellton-Mohawk drain at the expense of the United States,124 limit groundwater 
pumping, and support Mexican efforts to obtain funding for rehabilitating Mexicali lands 
with new infrastructures. Further, the United States committed to building the largest and 
most expensive desalination plant in existence anywhere in the world with a construction 
cost of $120 million, which by its completion in 1993 had more than doubled.125  
Though the U.S. had long insisted that both nations abide by the unchangeable 
1944 Treaty, the United States agreed to Minute 242, which modified the water-sharing 
obligation between the two nations on the issue of water quality. However, in this success 
for the Mexicali campesino and the Mexican nation and federal government, one element 
Mexico brought to the negotiation table failed to make the final resolution: “The 
agreement [did] not require any payments to Mexico for any past damages.”126  
In a speech given before The Colorado River Water Users Association, Brownell 
justified the conditions of Minute 242 to perhaps his most difficult U.S. audience, the 
representatives of the Seven Basin states whose constituents would be directly affected 
by the Minute’s conditions. On the matter of paying Mexico for past damages due to 
saline waters, Brownell explained why he refused to address this concern: “My 
instructions were to find a solution to the problem, not to become a party to a damage 
suit.”127 This was perhaps the only failure of Minute 242 for the Mexican parties involved 
and the most important concession gained by the United States.128  
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Brownell in his address also sought to rationalize the concessions made to Mexico 
in the resolution of the Salinity Crisis, while illustrating the benefits of Minute 242 to 
U.S. Colorado water consumers. His commentary not only reveals U.S. objections to 
paying for Mexicali losses but also the changing landscape, primarily political and social, 
that called for changes in the U.S. policies on the Salinity Crisis and the allowances made 
to Mexico. Brownwell stated, “The interpretation we gave the 1944 Water Treaty, albeit 
historically correct in my opinion, was no longer tenable in a hypersensitive, 
environment-conscious world,” presenting an ecological argument for solving salinity.129 
With this statement, Brownell presented a new theme that would define future 
negotiations regarding Colorado River water and especially the Delta: ecology.  
At the beginning of his speech, Brownell promptly addressed the struggles of 
negotiations with Mexico: 
During the course of difficult but amiable negotiations, Mexican officials at times 
questioned that I was proposing a just solution. No doubt the same thought has 
occurred to some of you. That both sides look upon it with some dissatisfaction 
may be the only kind of reaction good compromise can expect. I hope it is a 
favorable omen for the settlement.130 
 
With these words, Brownell succinctly characterized the nature of negotiations between 
the United States and Mexico on numerous issues, certainly not on salinity exclusively, 
but at the same time aptly described the peculiarities of the borderland struggles between 
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these two nations. Inextricably linked in numerous ways, in terms of economics, labor, 
geography, and water to name a few, the Yuma and Mexicali Valleys simultaneously 
fought to maintain their own identities and carry out their individual agendas. Yet, in the 
case of the Salinity Crisis, after much dispute and distrust over something so simple as 
water, complicated by something so intricate as a border, these two neighbors found 























“[The] Good Neighbor policy should be the rule of behavior of the persons who 
inhabit the same valley; who look out over the same panorama; who see the sun 
rise and set at the same hour; who live on the same street, and many of whose 
children attend the same school or play the same sports.”131 
 
The Good Neighbor policy, wrote Mexican Senator Manuel Tello, should not 
merely be an agreement between two nations, should not merely be the talk of diplomacy, 
nor solely the terms of compromise. Neighbors live side-by-side and a good neighbor 
cares when a leak in his home causes a flood next door. Unfortunately, this sense of duty 
was a foreign concept in the American West, especially when it came to water. 
Individuals living doorsteps away sought to deprive their neighbors of the right to water 
in order to gain advantage, further their own agendas and create agricultural empires. 
Healthy competition in the frontier became the wolf in sheep’s clothing for apathy and 
blind self-interest. Once borderlines cut into the desert soil of the Colorado River Delta, 
nationalism further justified reckless abandon of good neighbor principles. The Salinity 
Crisis taught the United States and Mexico a lesson in good-neighborliness by reminding 
the border communities of these nations of their interconnectedness and unavoidable 
interdependency.  
The crisis also exposed the overlooked environmental costs of large-scale 
irrigation in the Delta. Careless in their haste to transform sand into profit, early settlers 
exploited the land of the Delta without regard for its long-term implications. As both the 
agricultural production of the Yuma and Mexicali Valleys began to expand in the 1930s 
through the 1950s, irrigation practices led to the excessive accumulation of salts in both 
                                                





regions. Farmers began to see and feel the costs of their exploitive land use policies when 
their crop productions began to fall. Suddenly, the natural environ and agriculture shared 
an imminent ill fate and all those involved in the Salinity Crisis were challenged to think 
in terms of preserving the Delta. Residents and their representatives could no longer 
concern themselves with the prospects of agriculture in the Delta without considering the 
toll their practices were taking on the natural landscape. Thus, the Salinity Crisis 
introduced preservationist language into discussions about the Delta’s future.  
These revelations coincided with a burgeoning environmentalist movement that 
infected both nations beginning in the 1970s. To the states of the American West, 
concerned with both the diminishing quantity and quality of Colorado River water, the 
environmental movement proved directly applicable. A piece of litigation, Arizona vs. 
California, that occurred in the midst of the Salinity Crisis in 1964 demonstrated to the 
Basin States that their lavish overuse of Colorado River water was unsustainable, forcing 
them to refocus on preserving the water source and the lands adjacent the river. Arizona, 
less populated than California for many decades, did not use the extent of its Colorado 
River water allotment until the mid-nineteenth century.  Eager to supply water to its ever-
expanding farms and cities, California used both its allotment and the portion of 
Arizona’s annual allotment that Arizona was not using. Arizona successfully sued 
California in 1964, forcing California to live within its means and restrict its water usage 
to within its own allotment. With the fall of the most egregious offender of wasteful 
water practices, all of the Basin States began to revaluate their water management and 
refocus their attentions on sustainable water usage, utilization of the Colorado River that 





The Salinity Crisis spanned two eras in water policy: an earlier era of exhaustive 
overuse of the Colorado River and a later period focused on sustainable use of the source 
in light of the environmental movement. Further, the conditions of Minute 242 forced the 
United States and Mexico to work collaboratively to solve the problems of water quality 
and quantity in addition to environmental sustainability in the Delta. Solutions to the 
Salinity Crisis set a new precedent in the way the United States and Mexico addressed the 
sharing of Colorado River water, ushering in an new era of partnership in the Delta 
defined by the co-sponsorship of mutually beneficial infrastructures. The Salinity Crisis 
as a case study in U.S.-Mexico relations in the 1960s and 1970s reveals how the presence 
of a national borderline created prejudice between peoples inhabiting the same 
geographic landscape. Nevertheless, by engaging in the laborious yet necessary discourse 
to resolve the Salinity Crisis, Americans and Mexicans altered the course of future 
Colorado River water usage in the arid West, prioritizing a more sustainable and good-
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